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In the first instruction for implying or presuming malice on the part
of the defendant, the trial judge warned the jury that the presumption was
a rebuttable one. However, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
instruction despite this cautionary advice given by the judge. The Court's
concern was that jurors, while considering evidence tending to rebut
presumptions, continue to give weight to presumptive assertions rather
than disregarding them in favor of the evidence alone.
As to the second instruction for implying orpresuming malice on the
part ofthe defendant, the court warned the jury that admission of evidence
as to the circumstances surrounding use of a deadly weapon may remove
the presumption. This instruction is inherently contradictory and confuses
more than clarifies. As the Court pointed out, "language that merely
contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will
not suffice to absolve the infirmity." Francis,471 U.S. at 322.
B. Harmless Error Standard
When an error has been committed in the finding of guilt of an
accused, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that a test may be
applied to determine whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
Chapman,386 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). The Chapman test is a two
step analysis in which the court first must ask what evidence the jury
actually considered in reaching its verdict. Then, the court must weigh the
probative force of that evidence as against the probative force ofthe error
standing alone.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, applied a different
analysis in its treatment of harmless error. The state court's goal was to
determine whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
have found it unnecessary to rely on the unconstitutional presumptions.
SeeRose v. Clark,478U.S. 570,583 (1986) (holding thatSandstromerror
can be harmless). Based on this language, the state did not find the
constitutional error in its instruction to be a reversible error.
TheUnited States Supreme Court in this decision determined thatthe
Supreme Court of South Carolina misapplied the Rose v. Clark standard.
The inquiry should not have been whether it was unnecessary for the jury

to rely on the presumption; rather, to determine that the jury did not rely
on the presumption and thus no error resulted.
The Court, having set up the parameters of the test, examined the
entire record to determine what evidence the jury considered regarding
intent, removed from the presumptions themselves. It found that assertions of Davis' "lunging" and inflicting "wounds" were unsubstantiated
by the record. The mother died of a single wound and no other evidence
tended to prove Davis' malice towards her. On this evidence, the Court
concluded that the state court could not infer beyond a reasonable doubt
that the presumptions did not contribute to the jury's finding.
C. Impact
Attorneys defending capital clients may learn important lessons
from this case. Harmless error is a difficult standard to meet. Given a
particular fact pattern, a Sandstrom error may be harmless under the Rose
v. Clark rule. See also Waye v. Townley, 871 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1989).
However, defense attorneys- should recognize that an error will not
automatically be harmless. Often, even when there is other evidence of
guilt, the evidence may not meet the harmless error analysis. For
additional analyses of the treatment of harmless error, see case summary
of Arizona v. Fulminante, Capital Defense Digest, this issue, and case
summary of Satterwhitev. Texas, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1,
p. 14 (1988) (errors found not to be ham-less).
Another important lesson is to review carefully the jury instructions
to be given at trial. Yates may support a challenge to the Virginia second
degree murder instruction on malice. That instruction also raises a
presumption but adds that the presumption disappears if a reasonable
doubt is raised. The reasonable doubt caveat can be said to contradict but
not explain the presumption. This may create the same confusion that the
court condemned in Yates and lead to a successful challenge to the
Virginia malice instruction for defense counsel.
Summary and analysis by:
Laura J. Fenn

ARIZONA v. FULMINANTE
111 S. Ct. 1246, (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Defendant Oreste Fulminante was a suspect in the murder of his
11-year-old stepdaughter, who was killed on or around September 14,
1982 in Arizona. No charges were filed against him, and Fulminante
left for New Jersey where he was convicted on unrelated federal
charges and incarcerated in a federal prison in New York. While in the
penitentiary, Fulminante became friends with a former police officer
named Anthony Sarivola who was serving time for loansharking.
Sarivola was also an informant for the F.B.I. and was posing as an
organized crime figure.
Sarivola learned that Fulminante had been suspected of his
stepdaughter's murder. The F.B.I. instructed Sarivola to find out
more information concerning Fulminante. In October of 1983, Sarivola
offered to protect Fulminante from the rough treatment he was
beginning to receive from the other inmates, but told Fulminante that
he would have to know about Fulminante's involvement in the
stepdaughter's murder. Fulminante then admitted to Sarivola that he
had taken the stepdaughter to the desert, choked her, sexually assaulted her, made her beg for her life, and then shot her in the head.
Fulminante was released from prison in May of 1984 and made a

second confession to Sarivola's fiancee. Fulminante was indicted for
the first-degree murder of his stepdaughter on September 4, 1984.
Fulminante moved to suppress the first confession because it was
coerced, and the second because it was the fruit of the first confession.
The trial court allowed the confessions, convicted Fulminante of first
degree murder and sentenced to death. The Arizona State Supreme
Court, upon motion for reconsideration, found the confession was
coerced, decided that the use of a coerced confession could not be
harmless error, and ordered a retrial without use of the confession to
Anthony Sarivola. The Supreme Court granted certiorari upon appeal
by the State of Arizona.
HOLDING
In an opinion by Justice White, the Court affirmed the Arizona
State Supreme Court's decision and held that Fulminante's confession to Anthony Sarivola was coerced. In a second opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court reversed the reasoning of the
Arizona high court that use of a coerced confession is always reversible error, and instead held that admission of an involuntary confession is subject to harmless error analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
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S. Ct. 1246 at 1265. In the Rehnquist opinion, the Court differentiated
between potentially harmless errors errors which affect only the
procedure of the trial, and structural errors which violate due process
requirements so severely that their commission can never be harmless. Formerly, coerced confessions were generally held to be in the
latter category and so automatically invalidated the conviction. Payne
v. Arkansas,356 U.S. 560 (1958). The portion of the opinion authored
by the Chief Justice held that coerced confessions, once considered
institutional violations of the accused's due process rights, now may
be scrutinized under the more lenient "harmless error" standard. The
portion of the Court's opinion delivered by Justice White applied the
harmless error standard, held that the confession to Sarivola was not
harmless under these facts, and affirmed the Arizona supreme court's
reversal and remand of Fulminante's conviction.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Arizona v. Fulminanteis important because it changes what had
been a well established principle of criminal law. For nearly half a
century any reliance on a coerced confession invalidated the conviction even if there existed enough evidence apart from the confession
to convict the defendant. See 111 S. Ct. at 1253 (dissenting opinion
of Justice White providing history of decisions leading up to this
case). The majority specifically reversed this tenet of law: "It is
evident from a comparison of the constitutional violations which we
have held subject to harmless error, and those which we have held not,
that involuntary statements or confessions belong in the former
category." Id. at 1265.
However, the majority decision authored by Justice White applied the harmless error ruling to Fulminante's case and held that the
admission of the confession to Sarivolain the prison was not harmless.
Id. at 1257. The Court noted that in order to determine that a
constitutional error is harmless, the Court must be satisfied on de novo
review that the federal constitutional error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt". Id., citing Chapman v. California,386 U.S. at 24
(1967). The Court expressly stated that a confession where the
defendant discloses the motive and means of a crime requires the

reviewing court to "exercise extreme caution before determining that
the admission of the confession at trial was harmless" because of the
temptation it creates in the mind of the jury to find guilt. 111 S. Ct.
at 1258. In addition to looking at the prejudicial effect of the
confession upon the fact finder, the Court looked at the likelihood that
the confession prejudiced the defendant at the sentencing phase of the
trial. The Court also pointed out that in Fulminante's case, the
sentencer relied on the defendant's confession to establish otherwise
uncorroborated aggravating factors necessary for a capital sentence.
Id. at 1260.
The importance of this decision on the capital defense bar is not
inconsequential, especially when taken in conjunction with other
recent Supreme Court Decisions. The Court, even as it scales back the
scope of reversible error, is maintaining real constitutional protections through strict scrutiny of harmless error issues. Yates v. Evatt,
111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991) andSatterwhitev. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988),
with Fulminante, demonstrate the difficulty of the state's showing
that a constitutional error is harmless. In Yates v. Evatt the Court held
that unconstitutionally prejudicial jury instructions shifting the burden of proof to the defendant are subject to harmless error review. The
state in this case, however, was unable to meet the burden of showing
that the error was not harmless, and relief was granted. Likewise,
Satterwhitev. Texas held that violations of a sixth amendment right to
counsel during psychiatric examination are subject to harmless error
evaluation, but that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof.
Counsel should be aware that although they may encounter
harmless error evaluation of constitutional error on direct appeal, it is
by no means a losing position. The Supreme Court has consistently
held against the state if it cannot demonstrate that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant's case is even
stronger, and counsel should argue even more forcefully, when the
constitutional error violates fundamental rights. As the division of the
Court in this case demonstrates, where errors affecting these rights are
concerned, defendants may successfully argue for relief.
Summary and analysis by:
Peter T. Hansen

SCHAD v. ARIZONA
111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
A highway worker discovered the decomposed body of Lorimer
Grove, strangled with a rope around his neck, on the side of an Arizona
highway. The victim had last been seen eight days earlier driving his
Cadillac. The next month, New York State Police stopped Edward
Schad, Jr. for speeding in Grove's Cadillac. Schad explained that he
was transporting the car for a friend named Larry Grove. Schad was
later arrested in Utah for a parole violation and possession of a stolen
vehicle. Police found several of the victim's belongings in the
Cadillac, in Schad's wallet, and in an abandoned rental car which
Schad had rented several months earlier and never returned.
The applicable Arizona statute defines first degree murder as
"murder which is... wilful, deliberate or premeditated ... or which
is committed... in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate...
robbery." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-452 (Supp. 1973). Schad was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The conviction was set aside on collateral review and remanded for further
proceedings. 142 Ariz. 619, 691 P.2d 710 (1984). At Schad's retrial,
the prosecutor advanced theories of both premeditated murder and

felony-murder in support of conviction and the deathpenalty. Schad's
defense was that the circumstantial evidence proved him at most a
thief, but not a killer. Schad's attorney requested ajury instruction on
the lesser-included offense of theft, but the court refused. The court
did, however, instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree
murder. The court also instructed the jury that a verdict convicting the
defendant of first degree murder had to be unanimous, but the court
did not require unanimity as to whether the defendant was guilty of
premeditated murder or felony-murder. Under the court's instructions, the jury found Schad guilty and sentenced him to death.
At his appeal, Schad claimed, inter alia, that his federal constitutional rights under the sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments
were violated, in that: (1) the court failed to require unanimity
regarding the separate crimes of premeditated murder and felonymurder, and (2) the court failed to instruct thejury on robbery, alesserincluded offense of felony-murder, as required by Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625 (1980). The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Schad's
arguments and affirmed the second conviction. Schad v. State, 163
Ariz. 411,788 P.2d 1162 (1989). As to the defendant's first claim, the
court ruled that first-degree murder was "one crime regardless whether

